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WHAT GOOD IS HABEAS?

Aziz Z. Huq*

This essay examines empirically the effect of the
Supreme Court's 2008 judgment in Boumediene v.
Bush. Boumediene marked a sharp temporal break
because it introduced a new regime of constitutionally
mandated habeas jurisdiction for non-citizens detained
as "enemy combatants" at Guantanamo. The
Boumediene Court envisaged habeas jurisdiction as
serving a twofold purpose. First, it claimed habeas
vindicates physical liberty interests in line with a
longstanding historical understanding of the writ.
Second, the Court viewed habeas as a mechanism to
generate or preserve legal boundaries on executive
discretion. This essay gathers empirical evidence of the
opinion's effect up to January 2010 to determine whether
these goals were fulfilled. While the data is in many
respects ambiguous, it suggests the effect of Boumediene
on detention policy was not as significant as many
believe. For example, less than four percent of releases
from the Cuban base have followed a judicial order of
release. Even in those cases, it is unclear if judicial action
or something else caused release. Because the effects of
habeas jurisdiction have been uncertain and perhaps
marginal, effusive praise or blame of the Court's 2008
decision is premature.
Few axioms of constitutional law seem more self-evident
today than the proposition that the Great Writ of habeas corpus,
as protected by the Suspension Clause,1 is a "vital instrument for

*
Assistant professor of law, University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to
Baher Azmy, Brandon Garrett, Joseph Margulies, Eric Posner, and Matthew Waxman
for extremely helpful comments. Tim Greene and Amy Hermalik provided superlative
research assistance. My thanks to the editors of Constitutional Commentary for their
generous invitation to write and their further gracious tolerance of an essay that strays
from the designated topic. All errors, of course, remain mine alone.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 9, cl. 2.
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the protect ion of individual liberty."2 Also largely common
ground is the idea that habeas at its "historical core . . . has
served as a means of reviewing the legality of executive
detention. "3 So understood, the habeas writ ranks as "an
essential mechanism in the separation-of-powers scheme. "4 It is
one of the "necessary constitutional means" vested by the
Constitution's text in one branch "to resist encroachments of the
others" as part of a "constant aim . . . to divide and arrange the
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on
the other. "5 The integration of habeas into a larger account of
the Constitution's separation-of-powers architecture played a
prominent role in J ustice Kennedy's recent maj ority opinion in
Boumediene v. Bush,6 which has been labeled "one of the most
important Supreme Court decisions in recent years."7 Even
Boumediene's critics do not doubt habeas has policy
consequences, although they profess to be "mystif[ied] " as to
why a check on executive detention power is necessary.8
This essay questions the conventional wisdom about habeas
as a "check" on the executive branch. In Boumediene, the
Supreme Court supplied a twofold normative j ustifi cation for
constitutional habeas j urisdiction: It first directly promotes
physical liberty, and second reinforces the separation of powers
by preserving a limited government via enforcement of
unambiguous legal constraints on the executive branch. Using
the aftermath of Boumediene as a case study, I argue that the
resulting habeas j urisdiction has had at best a complex, largely
indirect, effect on detention policy. In the end, the impact of
habeas is far more ambiguous than either critics or supporters of
Boumediene have recognized. Harsh criticism and extravagant

2. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008).
3. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
4. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246.
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. ,
1961).
6. 128 S. Ct. at 2246; cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to
Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2110 (2009) ("The
Boumediene majority opinion expressly invokes the separation of powers in at least ten
additional passages. ").
7. Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2008,
at 18.
8. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE COURTS 256 (2007) ("There is no reason to think that the
executive would benefit from an excessive detention or conviction rate, or that political
constraints would permit the executive to implement such a preference in any event.").
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praise of the Court should both be tempered in the teeth of
persisti ng empirical uncertainty.
Empirical and doctrinal data for this essay are drawn from
litigation and judicial opinions following the Supreme Court's
Boumediene opinion. Boumediene concerned the scope of
judicial supervision of detention operations at the Guantanamo
B ay Naval Base in Cuba. Boumediene marked a temporal break
because it introduced a new regime of constitutionally mandated
habeas jurisdiction. Until J une 12, 2008, there was doubt about
the availability of habeas for non-citizens detained as "enemy
combatants" at Guantanamo. It was "widely assumed that the
Court would not intervene to invalidate executive action clearly
authorized by statute that implicated military matters and
foreign policy during a time of war. "9 So for many J ustice
Kennedy's maj ority opinion for the Court was a surprise. It also
set in motion a new line of district court litigation - the "enemy
combatant" habeas- with novel procedural rules, substantive
standards invented on the fly, and few preexisting expectations.
That litigation provides evidence of Boumediene's effect on the
Executive's policy options. While natural experiments about
constitutional design choices are rare,10 Boumediene sets up an
opportunity to examine (no doubt through a cloudy lens) the
effect of one abrupt shift in constitutional design.
Part I of the essay describes Boumediene and situates the
Court's theory of habeas as part of the separation of powers.
Part II analyzes the consequences of post-Boumediene litigation.
I examine first empirical data about detainee policy, and then
turn to the doctrinal aftermath. Part III offers some tentative
explanations for data presented in Part II, while underscoring
quite how much remains empirically elusive.
I
What role does habeas jurisdiction, as guaranteed by the
Suspension Clause, play in the constitutional order?11 According
9. Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 39 (2009).
10. We cannot, for instance, unspool history's tape to see what would be different
if, say, the Framers had prohibited textual supermajority rules explicitly in both federal
legislative chambers. Cf GARY KING, ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA,
DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 7778 (1994) (arguing for a counterfactual definition of causality).
1 1. I leave aside two largely settled questions here to focus on the "historical core"
of federal court habeas: First, should the Suspension Clause be read to guarantee state
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to Justice Kennedy's Boumediene opinion, habeas jurisdiction
not only promotes liberty but also plays a prominent function in
the separation of powers.12 But the strong connection between
habeas and the separation of powers elaborated by Justice
Kennedy is neither obvious nor necessary. To the contrary, it is
of recent vintage, and finds roots as much in Justice Kennedy's
views on structural constitutionalism as it does in the storied
history of the Great Writ.
A recent comprehensive account of habeas's origins in its
original early English context has argued that the writ early on
was not a liberty-promoting restraint but "fundamentally an
instrument by which the sovereign, through his judges, might
ensure that his authority w as not abused whenever an officer
acting in the k ing's name imprisoned someone."13 On this
account, habeas was at its inception not a tool for dispersing
power within government. Even its later celebration as a limit on
"arbitrary government" was largely a "fiction."14 Until at
minimum the seventeenth century, habeas operated in a political
regime wherein "every . . . instrument of authority in England
shared the same legal and conceptual source: the k ing. "15 In this
context, it was at best a mechanism for reducing the cost of
agency slack for the government's sole principal - the monarch.16

habeas jurisdiction over federal custody? The Supreme Court rejected this position more
than a century ago. See, e.g., Tarble's Case, 80, U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1872). In any
case, it is hard to see how state habeas could play this ambitious role now without
reworking the state court bench and fundamentally altering the larger political
relationship of the states to the federal government. Second, does the Constitution
require federal court habeas review of state court criminal judgments even absent the
statutory authority created in 1 867? See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-386. I
thus do not take up the debate as to whether the 1789 Judiciary Act would have allowed
the federal courts to supervise state criminal proceedings.
12. See text accompanying notes 3 1 to 55.
13. Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text,
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 587 (2008); see also
WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 14-17 ( 1980)
(tracing habeas's function back to Norman consolidation of government power). In his
magisterial new history of habeas, Halliday provides a compelling account of this
monarchical usage of the writ. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM
ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 64-95 (2010). According to Halliday's account, the writ was also
the King's means for protecting the liberty of his subjects; it played, that is, a double
edged role.
14. DUKER, supra note 13, at 40-41 (describing interactions of the Court of
Common Pleas and the Privy Council) .
15. Halliday & White, supra note 13, at 595 n.43.
16. Moreover, it was a mechanism for centralizing jurisdiction in the King's Bench.
See DUKER, supra note 13, at 33-40. This is the inverse of its purported role under the
separation of powers.
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It was a means for the k ing to rein in potentially wayward
vassals.
By contrast, in the American context the Framers proposed
a federal government designed "first [to] enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place [to] oblige it to
control itself. "17 The principal in the American model is
obviously no longer a k ing or centr al executive, but "the
people. " To control agency costs in this new model, which arose
from unavoidable slack between the people's instructions and
their repre sentatives' actions, James Madison emphasiz ed above
all elections as tools to enable popular monitoring and control of
elected agents. 18 But he also praised the fragmentation and
allocation of government power across three branches as an
"auxiliary" design feature to dampen the misuse of power. 19
Habeas tak es on a new role in this new context. In one
regard, American habeas is less significant than its English
cousin. In the English context, recent histories have argued,
access to habeas was a "critical mark er of subjecthood," an
indicia of the bond between subject and sovereign monarchy. 20
There is no evidence I k now of from the American context that
habeas has had quite the same symbolic weight. 21 On the
contrary, what is strik ing is how marginal a role habeas plays in
the Federalist Papers' canonical account of the separation of

17. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
accord Halliday & White, supra note 13, at 672-73. It would be an error to think the
Framers did not understand this shift. Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist 84 argued
that bills of rights were inapposite in the American context because they are "in their
origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects." THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
18. See THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1 , at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (describing "dependence on the people" as "the primary control of the
government."). Agency costs might be reduced by either monitoring or selection. See
generally TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
GOOD GOVERNANCE 99 (2006) (discussing agency problems in constitutional design).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1 , at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
I do not mean to suggest that Madison thought that the principal's view could be reduced
to aggregated democratic preferences. Nor do I address the surprisingly complex
question of why (or even whether) fragmentation promotes good outcomes. See M.
Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1 127,
1155-57 (2000) ("The exact reasons for a prohibition on the accumulation of government
functions is surprisingly difficult to pin down.") [hereinafter Magill, Real Separation] .
20. Halliday & White, supra note 13, at 634.
21. Professor Oaks's account of habeas in the states suggests that Founding-era
evidence of habeas's significance is at best ambiguous. See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas
Corpus in the States-1776-1867, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 247-51 (1965) (discussing early
state constitutional treatment of habeas, and noting, inter alia, that in 1787 only four
states' constitutions guaranteed it).
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powers, despite the fact that the suspension clause is one of the
only individual rights guarantees in the original Constitution of
1787. In the Federalist 84, Alexander Hamilton devoted only a
handful of sentences to describe habeas as a remedy for a
particular harbinger of tyranny - the "secretly hurrying" of a
person off the j ail out of public sight.22 Madison's classic
explication of separated powers, earlier in the Federalist Papers,
does not linger on habeas. Hence, even if habeas was significant
to the Framers, the writ was not a central architectural feature of
the new Constitution's dispersion of powers, as least as described
in the Federalist Papers.
Subsequent American debates about habeas have centered
on the scope of legislative control over the writ. In one of the
first judicial expositions of the writ's meaning, Chief Justice
Marshall seemed to split the difference, holding that power to
award the writ "must be given by written law," but once
jurisdiction had vested, "the meaning of the term habeas
corpus," would be given "unquestionably [by] . . . the common
law."23 Even in the twentieth century, there was still no
consensus as to how habeas operated. In 2001, a view of habeas
as a weak , essentially majoritarian institution still persuaded a
substantial minority of the Supreme Court. Writing for four
dis senting Ju stices, Justice Scalia argued that the Suspension
Clause "does not guarantee any content to ( or even the
existence of) the writ of habeas corpus," but rather regulated
one particular species of majoritarian abuse link ed to
emergencies.24 On Justice Scalia's view, constitutional habeas
regulates agency costs largely by mak ing suspension turn on
legislative preferences. Unsuspended, the writ falls within
plenary congressional control.25 At most, this might preclude the
Executive from asserting a unilateral "Merryman power" to
ignore a court's command absent suspension.26 By Justice

22. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
23. Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807) .
24. INS v . St. Cyr, 5 3 3 U . S . 289, 337-39 (2001) (Scalia, J . , dissenting).
25. Justice Scalia's account of habeas in effect accepts Robert Dahl's critique of
Madisonian democracy as in tension with majoritarian democracy. See ROBERT A.
DAHL A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 31-33 (rev. ed. 2006).
26. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Michael
Stokes Paulsen usefully describes President Lincoln's refusal to honor judicial process in
Merryman as an example of "autonomous executive branch interpretation." Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 83 (1993).
,
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S calia's admission, this is hardly a robust bulwark of separation
of powers.
The c ase law also contains a stronger view of habeas as an
instrument for the preservation of human liberty from arbitrary
executive branch action. Habeas, of course, has long been
associated with freedom from physical constraint.27 In 1963, at
the dawn of habeas's revival as an instrument of state-court
regulation, Justice Brennan explained that habeas's "function
has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for
whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. "28 Habeas,
he contended, redressed "denials of due process of law."29 In
2001, a majority of the Court in INS v. St. Cyr further styled the
writ as a "means of reviewing the legality of executive
detention" to ensure compliance with legislated limitations,
including the availability vel non of discretionary relief from
deportation.30 Liberty in St. Cyr was tied to legality. But Justice
S tevens's St. Cyr opinion did not articulate a more general or
abstract account of how habeas furthers the separation of
powers.
A more substantial integration of habeas into a larger
account of separation of p owers occurs in Justice Kennedy's
2008 Boumediene opinion.3 Boumediene's refinement, however,
may be best understand as part of a more general theory of
separation of powers that Justice Kennedy has developed over
three decades in cases unrelated to habeas or the Suspension
Clause. To understand this theory, it is helpful to consider first
Boumediene's holding and then to situate the case against the
back drop of Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence. In doing so, I do
not suggest Justice Kennedy is the first to articulate a role for
habeas in the separation of powers, but rather that his view is
consequential in this context.
Boumediene held that non-citiz en detainees at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base "have the habeas corpus
27. See, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961) (calling habeas "the highest
safeguard of liberty").
28. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963). Obviously, this diverged from the
canonical understanding of many English legal historians. See Dallin H. Oaks, Legal
History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 , 459-68 (1966).
29. Fay, 372 U.S. at 402.
30. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); id. at 303-04.
3 1 . Eric Posner has fairly noted that Boumediene also "turns on an implicit theory
about the rights of noncitizens . . . that is prior to the conception of separation of
powers." Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial
Cosmopolitanism, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 23 (2007) (emphasis in original).
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privilege" notwithstanding legislation eliminating statutory
habeas jurisdiction for their petitions.32 Justice Kennedy's
opinion began by ask ing whether the scope of the writ in 1789
provided guidance as to the territorial scope of the writ or its
application to enemy aliens today.33 Finding no clear answer to
these questions in Founding-era materials, Justice Kennedy
invok ed instead a originalist understanding of habeas's purpose
to inform a contemporary reading of the Suspension Clause.
Habeas's English history, Kennedy suggested, demonstrated that
"pendular swings to and away from individual liberty were
endemic to undivided, uncontrolled power. "34 In Kennedy's
account, the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act was a watershed in the
development of liberal limited government.35 (Historians, by
contrast, have cast that law as "merely codif[ying] " judicial
practices and not preventing "important innovations" via
common law elaboration36). Reasoning from that historical
example, Justice Kennedy then articulated a strong connection
between "the protection of individual liberties" and the
American "separation-of-powers scheme."37 Liberty and the
separation of powers are thus intertwined.
Justice Kennedy then suggest ed that "the Suspension
Clause" - or rather the jurisdiction guaranteed against
displacement by that Clause - "is designed to protect against . . .
cyclical abuses [during emergencies] ," by ensuring that " except
during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a
time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the ' delicate balance of
government. "'38 The writ's protections thus do not reside solely
in the fact that it imposes publicity and political costs on an

32. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
33. Id. at 2244; see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 (noting that "at the absolute
minimum the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 1789").
34. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246.
35. Id. at 2245-46 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137).
36. Halliday & White, supra note 13, at 611-12; see also id. at 611. ("A persistent
misapprehension about the English history of habeas is that the 'Great Writ' was a
parliamentary rather than a judicial gift.").
37. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246. Because the separation of powers serves to limit
government power generally, Justice Kennedy explained, its discrete manifestations, such
as habeas and the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, benefit not only
citizens but also "foreign nationals who have the privilege of litigating in our courts." Id.
(citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto)).
38. Id. at 2247 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality
op.)); cf Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963) ("It is no accident that habeas corpus has
time and again played a central role in national crises wherein the claims of order and
liberty clash most acutely.").
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abrogation of the writ as Justice Scalia suggested.39 Rather, it is
the ordinary availability of federal courts' habeas jurisdiction
that promotes both liberty and the separation of powers.
The opinion, however, does not clearly articulate the way in
which habeas jurisdiction will play this function. Justice Kennedy
provided but vague guidance as to either the procedural
contours or the substantive standards that would be applied in
determining eligibility for habeas relief.40 The closest the
Boumediene opinion come s to specifying a mechanism for
constraining government is a passage concerning the
Constitution's ratification debates, in which Justice Kennedy
claims that the Suspension Clause guarant ees "an affirmative
right to judicial inquiry into the causes of detention. "41 Later in
the opinion, he characteriz es the habeas inquiry as encompassing
"a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the
Executive's power to detain."42 While Justice Kennedy does not
go on to explain how this serves the separation of powers, his
logic seemed to build on Justice Stevens' St Cyr opinion: The
fu nction of habeas jurisdiction, on this account, is to ensure
compliance by the Executive with existing legal rules that cabin
executive authority to detain.43 An additional premise seems to
be that the enforcement of legal constraints on the detention
power plays a spe cial role in the separation of powers because of
the centrality of physical liberty to political competition and
debate .44
Nor does the Boumediene opinion contain a general account
of the separation of powers. The latter is a complex and
contested idea that comprises ideas a bout both separation and
equilibrium between branches.45 But while Boumediene has little
39. See Amanda Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 687
(2009) (arguing that "exercises of the [suspension] power must be closely guarded and
carefully checked to ensure that the power is not invoked except in the most dire of
national emergencies").
40. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266-67.
41. Id. at 2246.
42. Id. at 2269.
43. Another view would look to other constitutional entitlements as being
protected by the Suspension Clause. See Tyler, supra note 39, at 682 (" [W]here a
[constitutional] right is arguably bound up with the Great Writ, it is protected from
blanket displacement by the Suspension Clause's terms.").
44. Cf Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Even more important than the method of selecting the people's rulers and their
successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of
law.").
45. For a penetrating critique of several accounts of separation of powers, see M.
Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA.
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to say on the matter, its author, Justice Kennedy, has given
considerable thought to the separation of powers since he
penned the Ninth Circuit's opinion in INS v. Chadha.46 In
Boumediene, he cites two of his own earlier Supreme Court
opinions discussing the separation of powers.47 Earlier Kennedy
jurisprudence should therefore inform a reading of
Boumediene's characteriz ation of habeas and the separation of
powers.
As early as the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Chadha, then
Judge Kennedy articulated a distinctive vision of separation of
powers in the service of individual liberty. Writing for the Court
of Appeals, he identified two "principal purposes" of the
separation of powers: "preventing concentrations of power
dangerous to liberty and... promoting governmental eff iciency. "48
The Chadha opinion, however, does not explain how these goals
are to be reconciled in cases they conflict. It is thus only a first
step toward a general account of the separation of powers.
As a Justice, Kennedy elaborated his understanding of the
separation of power. The efficiency motif by and large vanishes
from his opinions.49 By contrast, Justice Kennedy has vigorously
pressed the theme of liberty. He has highlighted in particular a
"fundamental political sense" of liberty that "inheres in
[governmental] structure" absent any enumeration of
constitutional rights. 50 People benefit from "fundamental
L. REV. 603, 604 (2001) (arguing that "both commitments at the center of separation of
powers doctrine [separation and balance] are misconceived"); id. at 609, n.13 (collecting
other views).
46. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
47. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246 (citing Loving v. United States, 5 17 U.S. 748
(1996); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
48. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 425; id. at 422-24 (describing the separation of powers first,
as a means to prevent "unnecessary and therefore dangerous concentration of power in
one branch" and second, as a "practical measure to facilitate administration of a large
nation" by precluding "cumbersome entanglement" of Congress in laws' administration).
Kennedy's other Ninth Circuit opinion that addresses separation of powers takes the
formalist approach directed by Chief Justice Burger's Chadha opinion. See Pacemaker
Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instrumedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984)
(upholding 28 U.S.C. §636(c), which allows magistrates to conduct civil trials with all
parties' consent).
49. It briefly resurfaces, for example, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 616 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Executive
Branch should be free, as a general matter, to discover new ideas, to understand pressing
public demands, and to find creative responses to address governmental concerns."), and
Loving v. United States, 5 17 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996) (connecting the separation of
powers to "effective and accountable" government). See also Magill, Real Separation,
supra note 19, at 1 184 (discussing efficiency as a separation-of-powers value).
50. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
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political" liberty, on this account, when they delegate political
power to a government in which "one branch of government
[does] not possess the power to shar e their destiny without a
sufficient check from the other two." For Justice Kennedy, this
proves especially so in moments of crisis.52 Liberty, for Justice
K ennedy, is a state of mind. It is the psychological assurance that
each element of government will be check ed by other elements. 53
So " [w]hen structure fails, liberty is always in peril"54 because
such assurance evaporates. It follows that "fundamental
political" liberty is best promoted by clear, unambiguous limits
on government power.55
There is, no doubt, a touch of the ineffable to all this. But
Boumediene's authorship and its citations nonetheless suggest
the Court tak es it seriously.
To summariz e, the function of post-Boumediene habeas
jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees' petitions is a twofold
protection of liberty interests. First, habeas vindicates physical
liberty interests in line with a longstanding historical
understanding of the writ. Second, it is also, and perhaps more
significantly, a mechanism to generate or preserve legal
boundaries on executive discretion so as to ensure what Justice
K ennedy has called fundamental political liberty. That value in
tum is intertwined with the Constitution's separation of powers.
II
Boumediene created a rare opportunity to consider the
effects of habeas jurisdiction. Does habeas directly benefit

concurring).
51. Id.; see also Loving, 517 U.S. at 756 ( " [S]eparation of powers [is] a defense
against tyranny."). So defined, "political liberty" is separate and distinct from any
substantive conception of rights. Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("It remains one of the most vital
functions of this Court to police with care the separation of the governing powers. That is
so even when, as is the case here, no immediate threat to liberty is apparent.").
52. Cf Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 637 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("Respect for laws derived from the customary operation of the Executive and the
Legislative Branches gives some assurance of stability in time of crisis." Justice Kennedy
joined Justice Breyer's concurrence).
53. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 451 ("The individual loses liberty in a real sense if
[government policy] is not subject to traditional constitutional constraints.").
54. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
55. For a different analysis of the interests served by judicial review in detention
cases, see Daphne Barak-Erez & Matthew C. Waxman, Secret Evidence and the Due
Process of Terrorist Detentions, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3 (2009) (distinguishing
interests in individual dignity, accuracy, and systemic regulation).
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human liberty in the sense of ending unlawful detentions that in
the absence of jurisdiction's exercise would continue? Does it
enlarge liberty in Justice Kennedy's "fundamental political"
sense of promoting a constrained federal government? This
sect ion considers both questions by examining the aftermath of
the Boumediene decision. I first sk etch the back ground to the
Supreme Court's Boumediene opinion. I then identify sources of
evidence about its effects. In the central section of this paper, I
consider the evidence of Boumediene's direct effect on detention
policy at Guantanamo. I turn then to the less tractable question
whether Boumediene had consequences for "fundamental
political" liberty by considering the way in whic h the opinion
changed or confirmed the black -letter law of executive
detention.
A
Boumediene provides a rare glimpse at separation-of
powers jurisprudence's effect on the ground.56 Boumediene
abruptly changed expectations about the exercise of habeas
jurisdiction over petitions from Guantanamo. It was the first
time the Supreme Court had invalidated a federal statute
purporting to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts.57 And
it did so even after the Court had initially signaled, via a
threshold denial of certiorari ( later reconsidered) , that it did not
intend to police executive policy choices closely.5 W hile its effect
was not quite a shift from "no jurisdiction" to "plenary
jurisdiction," Boumediene st ill disrupted government actors'
expectations about detention policy's exposure to judicial
supervision. To understand why requires some back ground
about the detention policy at issue.
In its on gm s, the military detention operation at
Guantanamo was crafted to be beyond federal court jurisdiction.
Before the first detainees were transported to the base, although
not before construction of detention facilities, government
lawyers had concluded that the federal courts lack ed jurisdiction
over the base.59 Habeas actions first filed on behalf of detainees
56. This paper is hardly novel in proposing such an inquiry. For a pathbreaking
example of such analysis, see JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION (199 8)
(studying the effects of abrogation of the legislative veto in Chadha).
57. Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantanamo: The
Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1; see also id. at 13-20 (describing case).
58. See Boumediene v. Bush, 551U.S.1161 (2007) (mem.).
59. Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of
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in February 2002 were answered by threshold motions to dismiss
on jurisdictional grounds.60 The Supreme Court's 2004 statutory
ruling in Rasul v. Bush,61 affirming the availability of statutory
jurisdiction, precipitated the filing of many habeas petitions.
Congress, however, responded to Rasul by stripping habeas and
channeling cases into a new jurisdictional avenue in the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals under the 2005 Detainee
Treatment A ct ( "DTA").62 That jurisdictional strip was
reaffirmed by Congress in 2006.63
Due to the DTA review mechanism, Boumediene hardly
wrote on a jurisdictional tabla rasa. Yet uncertainty still obtained
about the scope of Court of Appeals review under the DTA.
One year before Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit had defined the
record for the purposes of this new avenue of review to include
all "reasonably available information in the possession of the
U .S. Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee
meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant. "64
This ruling prompted vigorous protests from the government,
which argued it did not have all "reasonably available"
information, and that gathering "reasonably available"
information would be prohibitively burdensome.65 Such protest
suggests that circuit court review under the DTA might have had
real bite.66 We will never k now. This avenue of review was
Defense from Patrick Philbin and John C. Yoo, "Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over
Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba" (December 28, 2001), http://
commons. wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2001 1228-philbin-yoo-guantanamo-habeus-memo.pdf;
cf KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO'S FIRST 100 DAYS
43 (2009) (describing initial construction before then).
60. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008).
61. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
62. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 1 1 9 Stat. 2680 (2005)
(codified at 10 U.S.C.§ 801, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)) [hereinafter DTA].
63. See Military Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006)
(codified in part at 28 U.S.C.§ 2241 (2006)) [hereinafter MCA].
64. Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Department of
Defense regulations), petition for reh'g en bane denied, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(per curiam).
65. See Bismullah, 514 F.3d at 1306-07 (Brown, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en bane) (summarizing and endorsing government's complaints). It is
impossible not to observe that the government was in effect claiming that it could lock up
men for eight, going on nine years, without process, even though it did not have at hand
"reasonably available" information pertaining to that detention decision.
66. At least in some instances, a habeas petitioner's ability to seek discovery and
introduce exculpatory evidence in ways that the DTA would not have allowed may have
been outcome dispositive. See, e.g., Al-Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 , 22-24
(D.D.C. 2009) (granting petition based on exculpatory evidence based on extensive
discovery by petitioner's counsel). I am grateful to Baher Azmy for drawing my attention
to Al Rabiah.
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exercised in only one case prior to Boumediene.67 Still, its
availability means that the legal effect of Boumediene was only a
change in the k ind of judicial oversight, not an absolute shift in
its availability.
New judicial superintendence took
the form of
individualiz ed district court litigation in the District of Columbia
District Court. That litigation did not begin quick ly after
Boumediene. Initially, Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan
consolidated the habeas cases and in November 2008 issued a
case management order stipulating rules for discovery, the
content and order of filing, and burdens of proof.68 Not all judges
followed Chief Judge Hogan's lead. Judge Richard Leon moved
forward separately. On November 20, 2008, Judge Leon became
the first district court judge to resolve a Guantanamo habeas
petition.69 Numerous other district court judges have followed
suit in reaching the merits of habeas actions. Judges have
reached a variety of procedural rulings and sk etched divergent
accounts of the scope of deten tion authority. In March 2009, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in a long
pending interlocutory appeal resolving some procedural
questions concerning classified evidence and the scope of
discovery.70 In January 2010, the court of appeals issued its first
ruling concerning the scope of detention authority with respect
to Guantanamo detainees.71 As of this writing, the post
Boumediene habeas is very much a work in progress.
The post-Boumediene inception of habeas did not mark the
beginning of releases from Guantanamo. Releases have been
ongoing since at least 2003. On December 16, 2008, just before
the first detainees who obtained final relief from a federal court

67. See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (granting detainees' petitions
for review).
68. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig. , No. 08-0442 (TFH), 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97095, at *96 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008). Judge Hogan was selected as coordinating
judge to handle uniform procedural issues in the cases so that they could be "addressed
as expeditiously as possible as required by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush."
Resolution of the Executive Session (D.D.C. July 1 , 2008), http://www.dcd.uscourts.
gov/public-docs/system/files/Guantanamo-Resolution070108.pdf. Judges Richard Leon
and Emmett Sullivan declined to transfer their cases. Sarah Lorr, Note, Reconciling
Classified Evidence and A Petitioner's Right to a "Meaningful Review" at Guantanamo
Bay: A Legislative Solution, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2671 n.13 (2009).
69. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008).
70. Al-Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 546-47 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(explaining that procedural issues would be resolved by analogy to the DTA mechanisms
and criminal trial procedures).
71. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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were released, there were 248 detainees in the facility.72 Since the
facility opened in 2002 through 2008, 779 prisoners had been
detained there.73 Habeas, therefore, operated against the
back drop of an ongoing circulation of prisoners and ongoing
efforts to process the prison population for release. One result of
these changes has been an alleged "shift in the detainee
population [at Guantanamo] toward al-Qaeda personnel and
away from Afghan Taliban and foreign fighters. "74 That is, as
more and more detainees have been processed, the remaini ng
population increasingly comprises individuals alleged to have
closer connections to terrorist groups as opposed to their allies.
By the end of 2009, about a year into the Obama
presidency, there was thus a significant body of evidence
comprising judicial opinions and policy changes about the
operation of constitutionally mandated habeas. This evidence of
habeas's operation up through the end of January 2010,75
moreover, can usefully be set alongside evidence about
detention operations prior to Boumediene, when only an
uncertain quantum of judicial review under the DTA was
obtained. The two sets of evidence enable a rough evaluation of
the effects of constitutionally mandated habeas jurisdiction.
B
To test the Court's aspirations for habeas, it is necessary to
look at patterns of detention and release before and after
Boumediene. In introducing this evidence, it is worth
emphasiz ing again that it does not come from a controlled
experiment. Rather, it comprises observations before and after
June 2008. The data certainly cannot show whether any observed
change to release decisions and rates is caused by habeas or by
another unobserved variable. At best, this data allows us to
suggest what might plausibly be the case, to rule out some
hypotheses, and to identify possible unobserved variables. It
emphatically is not evidence of causation.
Accurate data about detention operations at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base has long been hard to secure. As
72. BENJAMIN WITTES & ZAAHIRA WYNE, THE CURRENT DETAINEE
POPULATION OF GUANTANAMO: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 (2008) , http://www.brookings.
edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/1216_detainees_wittes/1216_detainees_wittes. pdf.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2.
75. The data for this article was gathered in December 2009 and January 2010. The
article does not address subsequent developments.
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the Brook ings Institution has observed, "the government has
never identified the interned population in a contemporaneous
fashion. "76 The data used for this paper are derived from several
sources. First and most importantly, information about the date
and volume of releases or transfers, the net detainee population
at Guantanamo, and the total numbers of detainees released or
transferred at any point in time has been drawn from statements
and releases by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S.
Department of Justice.77 Arguably, data about the timing of
releases is secondary in importance to data about the timing of
internal decisions to release, if the latter better reflect the impact
of judicial action on executive behavior. But the latter data is not
publically available. Until the transition from the Bush to the
Obama Administration, primary responsibility for releasing data
rested with the Department of Defense. After January 2009,
data was released instead by the Department of Justice. In a
break from Pentagon practice, the latter has not been releasing
information on the total number of detainees remaining at the
Cuban base ( although that data is occasionally available via
press reports) .
The second source o f information concerning the habeas
litigation used for this article is not governmental. Rather,
nongovernmental actors such as the New York Times,
ProPublica, and the Brook ings Institute have developed data
bases. Rather than reconstructing this data from scratch, I have
chosen to rely on these existing sources. The data presented here
was thus drawn initially from databases developed by the New
York Times and ProPublica. 78 It was cross- check ed against the
Westlaw database and data issued by the government.79
It should be noted that the data is lik ely unreliable at the
margins even if it accurately captures trends. For example, the
government is not always forthright about either releases or

76. WITTES & WYNE, supra note 72, at 5.
77. Copies of all material relied on for this data are on file with the author and are
available on request. See also methodological appendix.
78. Transferred-The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.
com/guantanamo/detainees/transferred; Chisun Lee, Dig Into the Gitmo Detainee
Lawsuits, PROPUBLICA, updated April 15, 2010, http://projects.propublica.org/
tables/gitmo-detainee-lawsuits.
79. Data gathered by British j ournalist Andy Worthington was also consulted, but
is not organized in a form that allows easy cross-reference. See Andy Worthington,
Guantanamo: The Definitive Prisoner List, http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/
guantanamo-the-definitive-prisoner-list-part-1/.
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sui ci des at the base.80 Hence, i ti s qui te possi ble that the data for
the aggregate number of detai nees at the base i n parti cular i s
occasi onally off by a small margi n. Moreover, government
statements concerni ng the release of detai nees do not i nclude
the names of detai nees or the preci se dates of release,
i ntroduci ng a source of possi ble error.
c

Consi der fi rst the i nteracti on between habeas and si mple
physi cal li berty. To what extent does habeas have the effect of
i ncreasi ng the wei ght assi gned to li berty i nterests as agai nst
securi ty i nterests i n a way that changes poli cy outcomes? Does
habeas, i n other words, both vi ndi cate li berty i nterests and also
change the poli cy space avai lable to the Executi ve?
One way of assessi ng habeas i s to compare the pattern of
releases before and after Boumediene. I thus begi n by looki ng at
the pattern of releases and detenti ons at Guantanamo i n the
larger context of 2002 to 2009. Fi gure 1 reports two stati sti cs:
The total number of pri soners at Guantanamo and the total
number of Guantanamo pri soners that had been released at a
gi ven poi nt i n ti me. Agai n, thi s data i s drawn from government
press releases that are not evenly spaced temporally, but the
graph has been modi fi ed so that each year occupi es an equal
amount of space on the x-axi s.

80. GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, UPDATE TO THE CURRENT
DETAINEE POPULATION OF GUANTANAMO: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 7 (2009) , http://
www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/1216_detainees_wittes/1216_detainees
_wittes_supplement. pdf
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Figure 1: Trends in Detainee Population
at Guantanamo ( 2002- 2009)
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Because the data in Figure 1 are not immediately amenable
to generaliz ation, it is worth look ing at the same data in
annualiz ed form. Table 1 and Figure 2 report the net detainee
population and th e cumulative number of detainees transferred
or released at the end of each calendar year since 2002. Table 1
reports changes in p opulation and aggregate transfers/releases
by year, and break s out the number transferred or released in a
81
gi ven year.
•

81. No annualized number of transfers and releases is reported from 2004 because
it is not clear whether all the 202 reported released or transferred by the end of 2004
were released in the calendar year of 2004.
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Table 1 : Guantanamo population changes , aggregate
releas es / trans fers , and annualiz ed releas es
and trans fers ( 2002- 2009)

End of
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
*

Data

Net Detainee
Population at
Guantanamo*
625
660
549
500
395
275
250
198t
comes

from

the

Cumulative
Number of
Detainees
Trans ferred
or
Releas ed*

Number
trans ferred/
releas ed in year
to date

-

-

-

-

202
256
380
500
520
560
final

press

-

54
124
120
120
40
release

issued by

the

government in a calendar year; t reported by New York Times on
January 11, 2010. No government number is available
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Figure 2: Trends in Guantanamo population changes,
aggregate releases/transfers, and annualiz ed releases and
transfers ( 2002- 2009)
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An additional set of data is useful in understanding the
context of these trends. Guantanamo is not the sole internment
facility used by the U.S. government for detainees in terrorism
related operations. The Bagram Theater Internment Facility,
located just north of Kabul, Afghanistan, has been used for both
individuals seiz ed in the Afghanistan-Pak istan conflict and also
globally.82 Trends in aggregate detainee population at Bagram
may be driven by two factors: developments in the regional
conflict, and, to the extent the base provides a substitute for
Guantanamo, governmental decisions to divert the flow of
detainees from Cuba to Afghanistan. Data on the Bagram
facility, however, is scarce. Figure 3 compiles the fragmentary
data available from press and government sources concerning
aggregate detention levels at Bagram. ( It should be noted that

82. See Al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009) rev.d 605 F.3d
84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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the x-axis on Figure 4 doe s not re pre se nt time in a line ar
fashion).
Figure 3: Tre nds in De tainee Population at the
Bagram The ate r Inte rnme nt Facility ( 2002- 2009)83
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Five thre shold obse rvations can be made about the se
multiye ar data se ts. First, the aggre gate de te ntion population at
Guantanamo pe ake d in 2003 and has bee n dropping e ve r since .
Ane cdotal information sugge sts that inflows to the base in fact
large ly drie d up in 2004, afte r the Supre me Court's first
inte rve ntions in the fie ld. The two large st transfe rs from the base
re pre se nte d in Figure 1 do not occur at the e nd of the time
pe riod, whe n habe as jurisdiction was in e ffe ct, but at the
be ginning. The y are in i) July and Nove mbe r 2003 ( re spe ctive ly
27 and 20 transfe rs or re le ase s) , and ii) Se pte mbe r 2004 ( 46
transfe rs or re el ase s). It is worth noting what was happe ning in
the fe de ral courts at this time : The Supre me Court grante d the
Rasul pe titione rs' re que st for ce rtiorari re vie w on Nove mbe r 1 1 ,
2003,84 and issue d its Rasul opinion o n June 28, 2004.85

83. Data in this chart is drawn from Alissa J. Rubin & Sangar Rahimi, In Shift, U.S.
Military Names 645 Detainees Held at Key Afghanistan Base, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010,
at A6; Tim Golden, Foiling U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/world/asia/07bagram.html; see also data
reproduced
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2008/0l/06/world/20080107_
at
BAGRAM_GRAPH.html.
84. Rasul v. Bush, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003 ) ( mem. ) .
85. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 ( 2004) .
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Second, after those initial large transfers, transfer and
release patterns settle into a stable pattern through mid-2008.
Periodic releases of between ten and twenty detainees at one go
punctuate a steady drip-feed of daily releases in the single digits.
The burst of movement from 2003-04 is not repeated. Moreover,
the annualiz ed number of releases remains stable. Indeed, given
the extraordinarily low variance in net release rates fr om 2006 to
2008, it is worth ask ing whether patterns of release in this period
were determined by an internal government quota rather than
by exogenous factors, such as information concerning detainees'
status or the changing situation in countries of release.
Third, even within the otherwise stable period of 2006-08,
some details merit attention. For example, after the enactment
of the DTA in December 2005, the rate of releases and transfers
did not manifest a discernable decline. On the contrary, transfers
and releases double between 2005 and 2006. There is also a
distinct contrast between the first and second halves of 2007. In
the first half of 2007, there were no days on which a double-digit
transfer or release occurred. In the second half of 2007, by
contrast, there were six separate double-digit transfers. In
think ing about these trends, it is worth noting that the Supreme
Court granted certiorari review in Boumediene on June 29, 2007.
Of course, there is no clear evidence this correlation signals
causation. An alternative explanation might point to internal
administrative dynamics that are not available to an external
observer, for example, around the iterative review processes
made available after Rasul for detainees at the base.
Fourth, the pattern of releases and transfers tails off
dramatically in late 2008 and 2009. With one exception, there are
no further days on which a double-digit number of detainees are
transferred or released. Moreover, the total number of releases
and transfers dropped by about 66.7 % from a stable 2006-08
level to a lower level in 2009. That is, just as the number of days
on which significant numbers of releases and transfers declined,
the overall number of release and transfers also declined after
three years of stability. The decline in transfers and releases
corresponds to the period in which habeas was available under
Boumediene. It also includes the period in which President
Obama entered office and assumed control and direction of
detainee policy.
Finally, aggregate detention levels at Bagram have been on
the rise since 2004. It is unclear whether this should be attributed
to the changing dynamics of the Afghan conflict or to diversions
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of trans fers that would otherwis e have gone to Guantanamo.86
At a minimum, the trend line for Bagram rais es the poss ibility
that increas ed judicial s crutiny of Guantanamo res ults not in less
detention, but rather detention in a different location.
The 2002-2009 timeframe is not the only lens through which
to examine the effects of habeas . The effects of habeas might
als o be vis ible in the time it has been available s ince
Boumediene. Figure 4 pres ents data from that timeframe. The
firs t data point, from December 2008, is for the firs t s et of
releas es of detainees who prevailed in the dis trict court. It is
hence a portrait of how habeas as a releas e mechanis m has
coexis ted with whatever clearance and releas e mechanis ms exis t
within the Executive.
Figure 4 s hows two s ets of data: Firs t, it illus trates "habeas
releas es ," i.e., releas es of detainees who had prevailed in a
dis trict court habeas action, from Augus t 2008 to December
2009. Second, it regis ters the "non-habeas releas es " during the
s ame period: releas es of detainees who did not have a final
judgment in a dis trict court habeas action.87 This data derives
from the non-governmental s ources noted above, and als o
government s tatements on releas es . Every care has been tak en
not to double count, although the incomplete form of
governments tatements about releas es mak es this a challenge.

86. Data about the locus of capture for Bagram detainees broken down by time
would be illuminating.
87. I have identified no case in which a detainee whose petition for habeas relief
has been denied has been released. "Non-habeas releases" includes releases of persons in
the absence of a final remedial order. Given the limited kinds of data available, however,
it has been determined how many of the non-habeas releases are individuals with
pending habeas petitions ( or at what stage their petitions are) . This data was generated
by cross-referencing government statements about releases with information about
habeas litigation generated by the New York Times and others.
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Fi gure 4: Trendsi n Releases After Favorable Habeas Judgment
( "Habeas Releases") and In The Absence of Judi ci al Decree
( "Non-Habeas Releases") ( December 2008- December 2009)
Habeas

v.

Non-Habeas Releases

(2008-09)

14
12
10

•

8

We mi ght draw the followi ng i nferences from Fi gure 4 and
underlyi ng data. Fi rst, duri ng the peri od i n whi ch habeas was
avai lable and the di stri ct courts were exerci si ng juri sdi cti on
pursuant to Boumediene, a total of 52 detai nees were released.
Second, from that total, 31 were what I have called "non-habeas
releases." In the same ti me peri od, there were 21 releases of
detai nees who had prevai led already i n habeas acti ons i n the
di stri ct court. Otherwi se stated, 60% of those released i n thi s
peri od were "non-habeas releases," and 40% were "habeas
releases." We can also roughly calculate the proporti on of total
releases that have followed as a result of habeas. As of
December 9, 2009, 560 detai nees had been released or
transferred from the Cuban base. Of that total, 3.75 % were
transferred subsequent to a fi nal judi ci al order of release.
Another perspecti ve on the effect of habeas juri sdi cti on i s
obtai ned by excludi ng non-habeas releases. In the peri od
analyz ed, there were 32 cases i n whi ch a di stri ct court had
adjudi cated a habeas peti ti on to completi on and granted the
peti ti on on the ground that the government lack ed legal
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authority to hold the person. In the same period of time, there
were nine petitions for habeas relief denied. In total, there were
41 cases litigated to final judgment in the district court during
this period. Within that set of cases, therefore, the habeas
petitioner prevailed 78 percent of the time at the district-court
level. To give some context to that number, compare it to the
rate at which habeas is granted to petitioners convicted in state
court and invok ing federal court jurisdiction under 28
U .S.C.§ 2254. The comparison, of course, is not one of lik e to
lik e. State habeas petitioners have benefited from access to a
court of record, while Guantanamo detainees have access only to
internal administrative procedures. Some might argue that the
more appropriate comparison is to federal court habeas release
of state pre-trial bail and dismissal decisions. But the
government has always insisted that the Guantanamo detainees
are in effect seek ing collateral review of the primary sorting
mechanism for mak ing military detention decisions, which is
internal to the military. Consider then that a 2007 study of § 2254
habeas found that of 2384 noncapital habeas cases, only eight
resulted in a grant of habeas relief, and one was reversed on
appeal.88 In that post-conviction context, district courts thus
grant relief 0.3 % of the time.
We see habeas's effect in another light by look ing at the
relationship of formal victory in a habeas action in the district
court to the fact of physical release. Of the 32 cases in which a
petitioner prevails, 21 have been followed by transfers or
releases. That is, in 65.6 percent of cases in which a habeas
petition is victorious at the district court in a habeas action,
victory translates into physical release. It is worth noting that
number does not include any cases in which the government
chose to appeal a loss in the district court. That is, the rate of
releases represents not just releases but cases where the
government has chosen to forego appeals. Since past releases
cannot be judicially undone on appeals, the percentage of
releases as a fraction of the total number of cases has a floor.
Table 2 provides another perspective on this data. It
summariz es habeas litigation by showing the percentage of cases
in which a district court has reached a final adjudication and
·

88. NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY
STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY
ACT OF 1996 at 1 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219558.pdf.
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decided in favor of the detainee. It also shows the number of
cases in which the district court has decided in favor of the
government. Note that the table does not contain data on
appeals. By definition, proceedings in which a detainee has been
released have not been appealed. But in those cases in which an
underlying detention persists, it of course remains open to a
party to seek appellate correction.
Table 2: District Court Habeas Litigation
( August 2008- December 2009)

Number
Habeas Petitions
Adjudicated ( as of
December 3 1 , 2009)
Habeas Petitions Decided
by a District Court in
favor of the habeas
petitioner ( as of
December 3 1 , 2009)
Number of 'meritorious'
cases in which relief
follows
Number of ' meritorious'
cases in which petitioner
remains detained89

As a Percentage of
all Habeas Cases
Decided

41

1 00 %

32

78%

21

51 %

11

27 %

Again, this data shows that the rate at which district courts
are granting the writ is far higher than in the postconviction
context. But there is an imperfect correlation between a district
court decision to grant the writ and a subsequent release order.
This empirical snapshot of detention policy at Guantanamo
that has been reviewed in this section reveals a surprisingly
complex picture. After Boumediene, releases in the absence of a
final judgment from a habeas corpus continue to dominate over
89. About half of these are Uighur detainees whose situation the Supreme Court is
slated to consider in the first half of 2010. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1235
(2010), aff'd on remand, 605 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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releas es in the wak e of a dis trict court remedial order. Non
habeas releas es compris e a majority ( 60 percent) of total
releas es in the 2008-09 period. Yet the rate of detainees uccess in
habeas actions has , at leas t through the end of 2009, been
s urpris ingly high, at leas t in comparis on to §2254 habeas . Within
the pool of s uccess ful habeas petitioners in the dis trict court, a
majority of almos t two-third obtain releas e without the
protracted process of an appeal. If a petitioner litigated a cas e to
conclus ion in the dis trict court, they were very lik ely to prevail,
and if they prevailed they were lik ely to have s ecured releas e.
Thus , although habeas may not have dominated as a modality of
releas e either from 2002 to 2009, or from late 2008 to 2009,
where it was us ed, releas e without the government's invocation
of the appellate process followed in a s urpris ing proportion of
cas es . Individual phys ical liberty may not be directly vindicated
by habeas in the aggregate, but the connection between habeas
and individual liberty in that narrows lice of cas es s eems robus t.
D
To ass ess whether habeas plays the two functions as cribed
to it by Jus tice Kennedy's majority Boumediene opinion, it is
als o necess ary to ask whether "fundamental political" liberty90
has been vindicated or confirmed s ince June 2009. As defined by
Jus tice Kennedy, this rather elus ive concept apparently obtains
when citiz ens k now that each branch of the federal government,
and in particular the Executive, operates only within a domain
defined and bounded by legal limits . "Fundamental political"
liberty, that is , is promoted by legal clarity and the ous ting of
ambiguity. Thus , we mus t ask whether Boumediene eliminated
legal ambiguity about the outer bounds of detention authority.
Three principal data points inform this inquiry: the Supreme
Court's Boumediene opinion; the government's s ubs equent legal
pos itions; and the Dis trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals '
January 5, 2010 judgment in Al-Bihani v. Obama,91 which ess ays
a more extended expos ition of detention authority. The latter
repres ents , at leas t at the time of this writing, the dis pos itive
legal rule concerning the s cope of government detention power
at Guantanamo. Together, Boumediene, the government's legal
res pons e, and Al-Bihani do little or nothing to promote the
90. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
91. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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"fundamental" political liberty celebrated in Justice Kennedy's
opinions. To the contrary, the evidence reveals a gap between
Boumediene's aspirations and its effects on black -letter doctrine.
Consider first the legal consequences of Boumediene. In his
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy characteriz ed the judicial
function in habeas as one of conducting "a meaningful review of
both the cause for detention and the Executive's power to
detain. "92 That authority derives centrally from the 2001
Authoriz ation for the Use of Military Force ( "AUMF").93 Even
though the Court had previously indicated it would flesh out the
contours of that authority,94 Boumediene provided no
supplemental guidance as to the metes and bounds of
permissible detention authority. Instead, the Court obliquelefs
cast doubt on another aspect of the plurality opinion in Hamdi. 5
The net result of Boumediene, therefore, was to leave the
substantive law of executive detention incrementally murk ier
than before. While doctrinal ambiguity is often one outcome of
Supreme Court review, it is at least peculiar that an opinion
justified as a means to promote legal certainty would leave so
much for subsequent resolution through an inevitably
fragmented process of district court adjudication and appellate
clarification. Boumediene, that is, can be criticiz ed for failing to
promote the legal clarity that was one of its central normative
premises. It was, on one view, an exercise in legality without law.
Second, Boumediene did not prompt any substantial change
in the Executive's legal position. But in the wak e of both
Boumediene and the subsequent shift from Bush to Obama, the
government bifurcated its definition of detention authority. It
now seems to apply one definition in litigation and another in
internal deliberations. This can only undermine the clarity of
boundaries on executive detention power.
Understanding this development demands a comparison of
government legal positions before and after Boumediene. During
the Bush Administration, the government applied a unitary
92. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008).
93. Pub. L. . No. 107-40, 1 15 Stat. 224 (2001). The Executive might also claim
separate authority under Article II of the Constitution.
94. In Hamdi, the plurality opinion declined to define the scope of detention power
beyond the facts at hand, but left the matter open for subsequent adjudication. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004) (plurality op.) ("The permissible bounds of the
category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are presented to
them.").
95. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269 (pointedly observing that the plurality in
Hamdi "did not garner a majority of the Court").
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understanding of AUMF-related detention authority. In federal
court, the Justice Department in 2008 invok ed the definition of
"enemy combatant" that had been applied in military status
hearings. The latter would have permitted the detention of any
"individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners [including] ... any
person who has committed a. belligerent act or has directly
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."96
The Obama Administration, however, has seemingly
developed a bifurcated approach to detention authority - a legal
definition and a less stringent set of functional criteria for
mak ing release decisions. It thus appears to have one definition
of detention authority for internal deliberations and a separate
one for litigation. In the post-Boumediene habeas litigation, the
Holder Justice Department has offered a new definition of
detention authority under the AUMF that encompasses
persons that the President determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 1 1 , 2001 , . . . persons who harbored those
responsible for those attacks[, or] . . . who were part of, or
substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners, including any person
who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported
hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces. "97

This definition appears to differ in onek ey regard fr om the Bush
definition: While the Bush definition allowed detention of a
person who "supported" al-Qaeda or the Taliban, the Obama
definition requires "substantia[l] support. " How much difference
that distinction creates is still uncertain. It is telling, though, that
research has revealed no habeas proceeding in which the Obama
Administration has reversed course by declaring that a detainee
previously thought to fall under AUMF detention authority does
not in fact do so.98 So far, the operative value of the legal change
appears de minimus .
96. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (CSRTs) Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July
7, 2004)).
97. Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Respondents'
Revised Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relation to
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 3).
98. As explained below, taskforce decisions to release detainees do not show a
change in legal position because the taskforce is not applying a legal definition of
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By contrast, the Obama Administration appears to apply a
wholly different calculus in internal deliberations about
detentions. In directing an interagency task force to assess
Guantanamo detentions,99 President Obama did not require the
task force to determine whether detentions were lawful under the
AUMF. Rather, he ordered new determinations whether
"continued detention is in the national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States. "100 In January 2010, the
director of the interagency task force, Matthew Olsen, confirmed
that forward-look ing risk assessments, not back ward-look ing
judgments of legality, guide release decisions. In an interview
with the BBC, Olsen explained that the task force ask s whether a
"person [can] be safely transferred out of the United States,"
and not whether the detainee fits within the AUMF's contours. 101
The interaction between the legal floor and the seemingly
discretionary functional standard for release is unclear.
The pattern of subsequent releases confirms the application
of this forward-look ing standard. The Administration has made
categorical determinations against release based on risk rather
than legality. In the wak e of the December 2009 attempt to
down a Detroit-bound airplane, for example, the Administration
ceased detainee transfers to Yemen based on concerns about the
southern Arabian nation's ability to handle returnees102 or "to
implement adequate mitigation measures to address any threat
the detainee may pose. "103 The net result is a policy on detention
in which wholly different standards are invok ed in internal
deliberations and in federal court litigation. Whether the
bifurcation can be attributed to Boumediene or the change in
administrations, it is hard to see the post-Boumediene situation
as a return to clear, consistently applied constraints on executive
detention authority.

detention authority.
99. The taskforce is discussed in more detail below. See infra at III.A.
100. Exec. Order No. 13492 § 2 ( d ) , 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009) .
101. Jon Manel, The Man Who Decides the Fate of Guantanamo Detainees, BBC
NEWS, Jan. 17, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/americas/8454351.stm.
102. See Steve Holland, U. S. Suspends Guantanamo Prison Transfer to Yemen,
REUTERS ( Wash. D.C. ) , Jan. 5, 2010. This was not an insight by the Obama
Administration. Through 2008, U.S. government officials expressed concern about the
Yemeni government's capacity to repatriate detainees without undermining that
country's fragile stability. See Dan Eggen & Josh White, Debate over Guantanamo's Fate
Intensifies, WASH POST, July 4, 2008, at Al.
103. Manel, supra note 101 ( quoting Matthew Olsen) .
.
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A further data point for assessing Boumediene's
consequences for "fundamental political" liberty is the D.C.
Circuit's January 5, 2010, opinion in Al-Bihani v. Obama,104 in
which the court of appeals first set forth its views on the scope of
detention authority under the AUMF. The Al-Bihani Court
drew on language in the 2006 Military Commissions Act and its
2009 amendments to hold that detention authority included
those who "purposefully and materially supported hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners," and to reject
arguments offered by both the habeas petitioner and the
government that the laws of war bounded detention authority.105
That is, the court of appeals looked to later-enacted statutes to
give substance to the ambiguous terms of the 2001 AUMF.
Al-Bihani resolves some of the ambiguities left open by
Boumediene but its approach to statutory interpretation
undermines the promotion of "fundamental political" liberty. At
a threshold matter, there may be little space between the Court's
"purposefully and materially support[ing] " standard and the
government's substantial support standard. Faced with what at
best can be characterized as meaningful statutory ambiguity and
a range of possible interpretive strategies, the court in effect
adopted one almost wholly favorable to the government's claim
of detention authority. Al-Bihani then is clearly not
characterized by the concerns about limiting government
expressed by the Supreme Court in Boumediene. But this is
simply to say that the government won, which may not be
especially telling.
More significantly, the Court of Appeals' methodological
approach to statutory interpretation belies the Boumediene
Court's account of the federal courts as a check on government.
Rather than looking to the canonical sources of statutory
interpretation, such as text, enactment context, or legislative
history, the D.C. Circuit looked to a pair of statutes enacted in
2006 and 2009. It used these later-enacted statutes to determine
whether the petitioner's 2002 detention under a 2001 statute was
104. 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The D.C. Circuit has elaborated Al-Bihani in
several further cases. See Bensayah v. Obama, No. 08-5537, 2010 WL 2640626 (D.C. Cir.
June 28, 2010); Barhoumi v. Obama, No. 09-5383, 2010 WL 2553540 (D.C. Cir. June 10,
2010); Awad v. Obama, No. 09-5351 , 2010 WL 2292400 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 2010).
105. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 (quoting Military Commission Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 1 18-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575-76 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 MCA]); see also
id. at 883 (Williams, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (observing
that "the laws of war have- even in the government's view- a role to play in the
interpretation of the AUMF's grant of authority").
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lawful. The Court of Appeals thus looked to legislative action
four years into the habeas petitioner's ongoing detention to
determine the lawfulness of that detention. To be sure, courts do
on occasion look to later-enacted statute to give meaning to an
earlier legislative provision. But this is rare. On one recent and
controversial occasion, the Supreme Court stated that "the
meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts,
particularly where Congress has s� oken subsequently and more
1
specifically to the topic at hand." 6 But it did so in a case where
Congress has expressly considered the legal question at issue and
where later-enacted legislation logically conflicted with one
possible interpretation of the earlier statute. Neither of these
conditions obtain in Al-Bihani. Rather, the later-enacted statute
concerns a different subject matter, and the logical nexus is not
107
compe 11mg.
.
More significantly, the Circuit Court's decision to gauge
detention authority in relation to later-enacted statutes is
inconsistent with a goal of promoting "fundamental political"
liberty by the elimination of ambiguities in the law and the
imposition of clear constraints on government authority. If
ongoing detentions can be defended by a detention power that is
redefined by statute four years into the detention, there is little
to prevent an amendment of the law so as to justify post hoc
propter hoc detentions that otherwise would be illegal. The
Executive can detain and then craft requests for detention
authority around what it knows about its captives. The
constraining effect of legality dissolves. Rather than boosting
legal predictability and stability, the D.C. Circuit's approach
106. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S. 120, 133, 147-51 (2000).
107. The Al-Bihani Court's assumption that the MCA's definitions, which apply to
military tribunals, apply to detention too is questionable. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870.
First, Congress addressed detention in the 2006 MCA, and yet choose not to define
explicitly detention authority. Second, the MCA defines "unlawful enemy combatant"
(which is a different term from "enemy combatant") for the purposes of military
commission jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit assumed that detention was a lesser incident of
the power to subject a person to military commission jurisdiction. It draws this greater
includes-the-lesser assumption from international humanitarian law, which the opinion
otherwise spurns. But the international law is based on a far narrower model of
permissible military tribunal jurisdiction than that endorsed by the D.C. Circuit. The
international law, as relevant here, "appear[s] to prohibit the prosecution of indirect
participant and nonparticipant civilians before military tribunals with limited
exceptions." Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J.
INT'L L. 48, 59 (2009). It is unclear whether the greater-includes-the-lesser argument can
be uprooted from its original context and applied to a very different baseline definition
of commission authority. It is thus far from clear that the D.C. Circuit's opportunistic and
selective borrowing of international law is principled or coherent.
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invites post hoc political interference at odds with Justice
Kennedy's predicate of "fundamental political" liberty.
In sum, Boumediene's promissory note for more ample
"fundamental political" liberty is still unredeemed. The Supreme
Court's failure to define detention authority has opened the
door to a new and confusing bifurcation of detention authority in
the executive branch, and an ambitious and broad reading of
detention authority by a court of appeals that leaves open ample
possibility of post hoc manipulation by the political branches.
III
How do these policy and doctrinal developments illuminate
the relationship between habeas, liberty, and the separation of
powers? The data presented here cannot answer that
definitively. They concern only one temporally bounded policy
(post-9/1 1 executive detention) . Nor do the data allow for
identification of causal effects. One especially nettlesome
problem of inference is that post-Boumediene habeas came on
line at roughly the same time as a major political transition from
President George W. Bush to President Barack H. Obama.
This Part sets out a tentative account of the data. For the
sake of clarity, I first address the most important potentially
confounding variable - the concurrent political transition. I
suggest there is scant reason to believe that the presidential
transition dampened any libertarian effect from habeas.
Returning to the data points explored in Part II, I tentatively
advance some hypotheses and further inquiries about the
constitutional role of habeas corpus.
A
The Supreme Court decided Boumediene in June 2008. But
the first district court release orders were not issued until
December 2008, little more than one month before President
Obama's inauguration. With the exception of Judge Leon,
moreover, the Justice Department was able to persuade all of
the judges of the D.C. District Court to delay adjudication of
habeas petitions until the new Administration came into office.
Hence, the political architects of Guantanamo detention policy
never had to explain their discrete detention decisions in federal
court. Habeas's effects on release rates, if they exist, are
comingled with and confounded by the effects of that political
transition.
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invites post hoc political interference at odds with Justice
Kennedy's predicate of "fundamental political" liberty.
In sum, Boumediene's promissory note for more ample
"fundamental political" liberty is still unredeemed. The Supreme
Court's failure to define detention authority has opened the
door to a new and confusing bifurcation of detention authority in
the executive branch, and an ambitious and broad reading of
detention authority by a court of appeals that leaves open ample
possibility of post hoc manipulation by the political branches.
III
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powers? The data presented here cannot answer that
definitively. They concern only one temporally bounded policy
(post-9/1 1 executive detention). Nor do the data allow for
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problem of inference is that post-Boumediene habeas came on
line at roughly the same time as a major political transition from
President George W. Bush to President Barack H. Obama.
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sake of clarity, I first address the most important potentially
confounding variable - the concurrent political transition. I
suggest there is scant reason to believe that the presidential
transition dampened any libertarian effect from habeas.
Returning to the data points explored in Part II, I tentatively
advance some hypotheses and further inquiries about the
constitutional role of habeas corpus.
A
The Supreme Court decided Boumediene in June 2008. But
the first district court release orders were not issued until
December 2008, little more than one month before President
Obama's inauguration. With the exception of Judge Leon,
moreover, the Justice Department was able to persuade all of
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Hence, the political architects of Guantanamo detention policy
never had to explain their discrete detention decisions in federal
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The change from a Republican to a Democratic
Administration might be expected to correlate with an increased
emphasis on libertarian over security values. Polling data
gathered by the Pew Research Center from 2001 to 2007 reveals
a "deep divide" on national security issues between Republicans
and Democrats, with a 20 percentage point difference in their
willingness to eliminate civil liberties.108 So more releases in the
absence of judicial direction, therefore, might be expected under
President Obama than President Bush simply by dint of the
constituencies responsible for the former's electoral victory. This
in tum might be expected to dilute the libertarian effect of
habeas as petitioners who would otherwise obtain judicial relief
are preemptively released by the Administration.
But this hypothesis is not borne out by the facts. The effect
of the change in Administration on security policy more
generally has been ambiguous. Some commentators find little
practical difference.109 The new Administration also has reasons
to move more slowly than its supporters might wish. While left
libertarian members of the Administration may view the volume
of Guantanamo detentions as excessive, the new President may
be unwilling to antagonize the security agencies, such as the
CIA. Presumably, it is difficult to secure desired policy
cooperation without buy-in from a substantial part of that
agency's leadership and senior personnel.110 Worse for left
libertarians, release of detainees during a Democratic
Administration is more politically costly than release under
Bush. Whereas few on either left or right attacked the Bush
White House for excessive leniency on its release policy,
President Obama expected and received assaults from the right
on the issue.111 At the margin then, each release is more costly at
the polls for Obama than for Bush.
108. Obviously, Republicans tend to be more pro-security. See Darshan Goux,
Patrick Egan & Jack Citrin, The War on Terror and Civil Liberties, in PUBLIC OPINION
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 322-25 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin, & Patrick
J. Egan, eds. 2008).
109. See Peter Baker, Obama's War over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG. , Jan. 17, 2010, at
30 (quoting James Carafano as saying about Obama's approach to national security: "I
don't think it's even fair to call it Bush lite . . . . It's Bush. It's really, really hard to find a
difference that's meaningful and not atmospheric.").
1 10. President Obama's resistance to left-of-center calls for investigation and
prosecution of detainee abuse may best be understand as an effort to keep security
agencies on-side. In general, the degree to which subordinate agencies impose a
constraint on decision-making by the White House is a topic that has not received
sufficient attention in the national security literature.
1 1 1. See, e. g., Obama Responds to Cheney's Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at
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As I noted in Part II, the Obama White House crafted a
mechanism for detention policy-making to reflect this political
pressure: Delegating the hard decisions to someone else who
would take the political heat.112 Two days after his inauguration,
on January 22, 2009, President Obama established an
interagency taskforce to "undertake a prompt and thorough
review of the factual and legal bases" for detentions at
Guantanamo. 1 13 Styled as a body of neutral, but largely military,
expertise,114 the taskforce provided the Obama Administration
with an argument that releases would be the product of
professional deliberation and calculus rather than first-order
liberal political preferences. Reliance on the taskforce
mechanism meant delays in releases, while the taskforce was
assembled and began its work of assembling dossiers on the
detainees.115 The taskforce also became a source of delay in the
litigation, where the government argued that any discovery
access to files created by the taskforce about given detainees
would delay individual habeas proceedings by weeks or
months.116 The effect of delay was to disperse a set of hard
decisions across an uncertain period of time, making it more
difficult for the Administration's political opponents to mobilize
against it. Looking at the taskforce mechanism, it might thus be
expected that the release rate for Guantanamo would drop
immediately after the January 2009 inauguration, as indeed
seems to have been the case. On this account, internal political
change would not be a substitute for the libertarian effects of
habeas.
Al 7 (summarizing criticisms by former Vice President Richard Cheney).
1 12. It is well known that delegation is a way for legislators to evade hard choices
while reaping the benefits of a decision. See MICHAEL T. HA YES, LOBBYISTS AND
LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS 93-94 (1981). I am simply pointing
out how the president can benefit from a similar tactic.
1 13. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 2(d), 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009).
1 14. See id. at §4(b) (listing principals, including the Attorney General, the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of
National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and also
emphasizing the inclusion of "employees with intelligence, counterterrorism, military,
and legal experience"). Military expertise dominates numerically over legal expertise,
although the taskforce's director is a career Department of Justice attorney with special
expertise in national security.
1 15. See Obama Task Force Determine Fate of Terror Detainees, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Feb. 20, 2009.
1 16. See In re Guantanamo B ay Litig., Mem. Of Points & Auths. in Support of
Resp's' Motion for Reconsideration of Orders Regarding Discovery from Guantanamo
Review Task Force & Motion Consolidating Order Regarding Task Force Discovery,
Misc No. 98-442 (TFH), dkt no. 553-2, May 12, 2009, at 2, 13 (on file with author)
(predicting delays of between four and twelve months).
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In the litigation trenches, moreover, government strategy
has been characterized by stability rather than change. Recall
that Justice Department litigation strategy between 2002 and
2009 in the habeas cases focused on jurisdictional issues. Its net
effect was to deny or at least defer judicial consideration of the
merits in habeas cases. Under Obama's direction, one might
initially expect, government lawyers may be less inclined to seek
appellate review or otherwise delay a release. More cases might
go forward and more releases might result. An unsystematic
review of a sample of government papers via Westlaw, however,
suggests that the personnel litigating the Guantanamo cases have
not changed significantly. Even if the Obama Administration
wished to change the way that the Guantanamo cases were
litigated, moreover, it would be a complex matter to obtain the
personnel changes across two departments to achieve this end.
Finally, "it takes time for presidents to staff the administrative
state,"117 with higher offices attended to before line positions.118 It
is thus plausible to expect that government litigation strategy
would not change significantly with the Bush-Obama transition
because of the difficulties confronting all new presidents in
reorienting policy and the tendency to do so fr om the top down.
In sum, the effect of transition fr om the Bush White House
to an Obama Administration on detainee policy is far from
predictable. On the contrary, it is highly ambiguous. But perhaps
the most plausible expectation is that the political transition
would lead to a dip in aggregate release rates as the taskforce
came on line, but that the government's litigation strategy would
likely remain constant.119 Against this backdrop, there is little
reason to expect that the libertarian effects of habeas would be
diluted against the larger backdrop of regime change.

1 17. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency
Positions, 82 S. CAL L. REV. 913, 918 (2009).
118. ANNE JOSEPH O'CONNELL, LET'S GET IT STARTED: WHAT PRESIDENT-ELECT
OBAMA CAN LEARN FROM PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS IN MAKING POLITICAL
APPOINTMENTS
1-2
(2009),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/01/pdf/
presidential_appointments. pdf.
1 19. Conversations with habeas counsel suggest that this is so. Counsel with whom I
spoke pointed to government litigation strategy over attorney access, the discovery of
exculpatory materials, and the timing of both returns and mandated disclosures as
evidence that the government continued to pursue a strategy of deferment or limitation.
The question whether government litigation strategies change with shifts in an
Administration's political orientation is a complex one and merits a more systematic
treatment than this.
.
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B
Even once the political change in the White House is
accounted for, the data presented in Section II still pose a
complex interpretive challenge. Even setting aside problems
with data released by the government, changes in detention
policy cannot be causally linked to activity in the courts without
considerable hesitation. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some
general conclusions, and to attempt some more granular
speculation about the likely influence of habeas upon policy.
One central finding stands out: While the data is in many
respects ambiguous, it strongly suggests that the effect of
Boumediene on detention policy was not significant. It is striking
that at the most, less than four percent of releases from the
Cuban base have followed a judicial order of release - and even
in these case it is not wholly clear that release would not have
happened sooner or later. Moreover, the annualized number of
releases drops after Boumediene. Even in those few cases in
which the habeas writ has been granted, nagging questions
persist about the scope and effective force of the federal court's
remedial authority. Courts to date (with a few exceptions) have
been reluctant to direct outright release, and have instead issued
delicately phrased pleas to "try harder" to the Executive
(although in more than two dozen cases, the data in Table 2
show, the Executive heeds this plea) . From a distance, therefore,
habeas seems far from an effective tool for checking executive
authority. The ambitious claims made in the literature for and
against Boumediene are thus misguided.
Further, there is no positive relationship between the
doctrinal consequences of Boumediene and its progeny on the
one hand, and the "fundamental political" liberty celebrated by
Justice Kennedy. The black-letter law of detention, and the
implementation of that law by the government, is no clearer, no
more stable, and no more coherent than it was before
Boumediene. The latter case cast some doubt on the guiding
force of Hamdi, while the D.C. Circuit's Al-Bihani decision blew
past Hamdi in its haste to embrace legislative language from
2006 and 2009. The Al-Bihani Court's methodology invites post
hoc gerrymandering of detention policy by Congress. The net
result is bleak on either one of Boumediene's metrics: Habeas is
not central to the protection of physical liberty, at least in the
experience of the Guantanamo detainees. And "fundamental
political" liberty, to the extent that it is deepened by judicial
confirmation of clear bounds to executive authority, has been
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disserved, if not wholly displaced, by the combination of
Boumediene's fecklessness and Al-Bihani's invitation to
mischief. Federal courts, it seems, are too hesitant and
circumspect in their approach to executive detention decisions to
vindicate "fundamental political" liberty via the elaboration of
black-letter rules. The data, on this reading, should be little
comfort for those who claim to value the separation of power.
Neither part of Boumediene's justifying logic, in other words, has
yielded much by way of practical result. Its consequences are on
the one hand doctrinal ambiguity and on the other practically
uncertainty.
But this is not to say that the federal courts' exercise of
habeas jurisdiction has had no effect upon the executive policy
space. To observe an absence of large, direct effects from habeas
is not to rule out the possibility of smaller, indirect effects.
Habeas, that is, may serve liberty indirectly. Although the larger
claims on behalf of habeas might be unwarranted, it is certainly
possible, and even probable, that habeas has a meaningful
incentive effect that can be traced in the data. To identify such
an indirect effect entails situating the writ in a larger institutional
context of the courts' interactions with other branches of
government. The data presented here does not allow a detailed
investigation of such indirect connections. But it is suggestive. In
the balance of this paper, therefore, I sketch a tentative account
of how federal court action both before and after Boumediene
may have altered the Executive's options based on the limited
data available.
Start with the period before Boumediene, when the natural
assumption would be that patterns of releases and detentions are
unrelated to what goes on in the courts. But this assumption may
be overstated. From the perspective of a rational Executive
deciding on detention policy under uncertainty, the Supreme
Court's rulings in Hamdi and Rasul might be viewed as warnings
from the Court - call them shots across the bow- that the
government's approach to detention policy lacked the indicia of
professionalism and reliability that the Court searches for in
granting the deference often evinced on national security and
foreign affairs matters.120 As I have argued elsewhere,121 these
120. For an argument that this was at work in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006), see Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 94-95.
121. See Aziz Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV.
225.
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decisions catalyzed important structural changes to detainee
policy within the government but skirted even the hint of
individualized release.
Between Rasul and Hamdi, the Court forced the Executive
into a wholesale restructuring of detainee processing. Until those
decisions, the government had done little by way of release. 2004
is the first year in which a non-trivial number of releases can be
observed. Until Rasul and Hamdi, moreover, military officials
would have had little reason to institute a meaningful processing
and release policy. It is highly unlikely that marginal fiscal
effects have much motivating effects in this area. It is far from
clear that bureaucrats in general are ever sensitive to marginal
fiscal costs.122 And the idea that terrorism detention should be
driven by fiscal concerns is implausible. On the other side of the
ledger, individual releases are politically costly as admissions of
error by the government. Even if the nation would be better off
with a detention policy that appeared less lawless, institutional
incentives might thus preclude development of such a policy. On
this account, Rasul and Hamdi break an equilibrium
characterized by an absence of releases by adding a new factor
to officials' calculations. In the wake of those decisions, officials
had to account for the risk that courts would intervene directly,
with potentially embarrassing consequences.123
The observed pattern of releases, described in Figures 1 and
2 above, is at least consistent with this account. There are spikes
in release in November 2003, soon after the Supreme Court
granted the Rasul petitioners' request for certiorari review,124 and
in September 2004, two months after the Rasul opinion was
issued.125 That is, increases in the rate of releases might
correspond to judicial action raising the probability of intrusive
judicial supervision. These correspondences, however, are at
best rough: The time lag between judicial events and policy
changes is between weeks and months. Confounding factors
simply cannot be eliminated in either case.
The data nonetheless allows the inference that Rasul and
Hamdi had two important indirect effects: They triggered
122. See Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 370-71 (2000).
123. To the extent that officials are concerned about the power of their branch in the
abstract, the prospect of more robust judicial interference may have costs beyond the
reputational.
124. Rasul v. Bush, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003) (mem.).
125. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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sunshine and generated a "support infrastructure" that imposed
larger political and publicity costs for continued detentions.
First, those decisions ratcheted up the number of Guantanamo
detainees with lawyers. In 2004, the habeas litigation in the
Supreme Court involved a mere fourteen individuals.126 By 2009,
even after serial depletion of the detainee population, there have
been more than 200 habeas actions filed. Many of the lawyers
work for large commercial law firms, doing habeas pro bono.
Several such firms, such as Venable LLP, Jenner & Block,
WilmerHale, and Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, have close and
continuing contacts with government.127 Some lawyers quit
commercial practice to work full-time on habeas litigation.
Coordinating this group, the Center for Constitutional Rights
runs an email list-service for the several hundred lawyers,
located across the country, who represent detainees. The net
result of this activity was a "vibrant . . . support structure"
distantly akin to ones observed in mid-twentieth century
America prior to the civil rights revolution.128 At a minimum,
Rasul and Hamdi opened the door to the growth of this support
structure. More ambitiously, it is possible that the decisions had
a legitimating effect on mobilization efforts in the private sphere
on behalf of the detainees.
Litigation leveraging this support structure meant lawyers
visiting the Cuban base for the first time in 2004.129 It meant not
merely greater litigation pressure on the government, but, more
significantly, a much greater flow of potentially embarrassing
information back to the United States. In some cases of
obviously erroneous detention, the government chose release
rather than protracted litigation that could detract from the
larger portrait painted of Guantanamo as containing only highly
dangerous detainees.130 Sunshine, that is, was one of the indirect
results of the Rasul and Hamdi decisions that generated new
costs for the government.
Also consistent with this narrative is the parallel rise in
detention operations at Bagram. The increasing use of Bagram
126. Id. at 470.
127. See generally THE GUANTANAMO LA WYERS: INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE
LAW 31-32 (Mark P. Denbeaux & Jonathan Hafetz eds., 2009) (describing early stages of
litigation).
128. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LA WYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 20-22 (1998).
129. Denbeaux & Hafetz, supra note 127, at 55-56.
130. See, e.g., MURAT KURNAZ, FIVE YEARS OF MY LIFE: AN INNOCENT MAN AT
GUANTANAMO 18, 219-20 (2008).
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for detainees captured as far afield as Dubai and Thailand131 is
plausible evidence that Rasul and Hamdi prompted not only
more robust internal procedures for detention operations, but
also jurisdictional circumvention. Just as the initial choice of
Guantanamo was driven by a concern to minimize "litigation
risk," so after Rasul and Hamdi it was predictable that officials
would look for new ways of reducing the costs of judicial
supervision. Hence the flight to Bagram. Today, the prospect of
increased j udicial supervision of Bagram may well precipitate a
flight to more durable redoubts from federal court
superintendence. The recent U.S. decision to hand Ba gram over
to Afghan authorities, which in effect raises a possible new
jurisdictional hurdle to ongoing habeas litigation, corroborates
this.132
The Executive's response to Boumediene provides further
evidence of the judiciary's indirect influence on detention policy.
On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court initially denied certiorari in
Boumediene. The Court's decision on June 29, 2007, to reverse
course by granting a petition for rehearing in Boumediene was a
surprise, and so provided new information about the Court's
intentions.133 Petitions for rehearing are rarely granted by the
Supreme Court. A Bayesian Executive would treat the grant of
certiorari in Boumediene as telling evidence that closer judicial
scrutiny was forthcoming. The data in Figures 1 and 2 for the six
month period from June 2007 onward show a higher rate of
release correlated with the Boumediene certiorari grant. Again,
this is some evidence of an indirect effect from habeas
jurisdiction. Moreover, the idea that the Court responds to
signals of professionalization (or the lack thereof) gains
credibility from the manner of the Court's decision to grant
certiorari in Boumediene. As Daniel Meltzer has persuasively
argued, that volte-face is best understood in light of disclosures
by former military officers alleging that the military's internal
process used to sort detainees was rigged to generate outcomes
sought by the government.134 Jurisdiction is thus the progeny of
judicial distrust.

131. See Al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009) rev'd 605 F.3d
89 (D.C. Cir. 2010) .
132. See Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility for Afghan Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at AS.
133. Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1161 ( 2007 ) ( mem. ) .
134. Meltzer, supra note 57, at 47-50. It may be more accurate to say that the
traditional deference owed the military was ousted by evidence of political influence.
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Now consider the policy landscape in the wake of
Boumediene. By the end of 2008, the effect of hundreds of
releases had been to increase the concentration of detainees with
allegedly more substantial ties to terrorism, and to dilute the
number of detainees with only weak connections to al-Qaeda or
the Taliban. A lion's share of easy cases have thus been resolved.
The liberatory effects of sunshine and litigation infrastructure
were equally subject to diminishing returns. Moreover, the shift
from the Bush to Obama presidencies may have undermined the
political value of disclosure, which went for detainees' advocates
from being a convenient way of embarrassing a disliked
government to a delicate question to be negotiated with a
presumptively favorable Administration.135 Remaining cases
often presented difficulties because of foreign policy
complications attendant on release.136 Others, including the
authors of many Yemenis, raised security concerns related to
conditions in their country of release. (Indeed, as of September
2009, a third of the 78 detainees cleared for transfer were
Yemeni, while 13 were Chinese Uighurs, whose release was
opposed by the Chinese government.)137 That is, by the time of
Boumediene, the odds were that habeas would be too little, too
late, as a remedy to unlawful detention.
Despite these obstacles, the small minority of detainees who
have pressed habeas actions not only proceed to final judgment
but tend to obtain a favorable outcome of release. How might
this assuredly incremental effect be explained? One hypothesis
would be that releases following habeas actions are substitutes
for, rather than complements to, releases in the absence of
habeas jurisdiction. That is, even the figure of 3.75 % releases by
habeas is an overstatement. Net releases would, in fact, not
135. It is further worth observing (somewhat loosely) that President Obama's
election, and his public decision to close Guantanamo, deflated a political alliance
between left-liberal activists and a large segment of the public and foreign policy elite
that had disliked the effect Guantanamo had on foreign relations. Through his January
22, 2009, announcement and his June 4, 2009, Cairo speech, the new President in effect
razed the political coalition that had built up during the Bush years without changing
much by way of policy. Obama's corrosive effect on the left-liberal reforming coalition
may have been the most important national-security related change accomplished in
January 2009. In the new light of the Obama presidency, disclosures of new abuse or
arguments about the injustice at continuing detention had to overcome a cognitive
dissonance in their audience.
136. This seems to be the case for the ethnic Uighurs, who are petitioners in the
Kiyemba case in the U.S. Supreme Court. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1235
(2010) aff'd on remand 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
137. See Governance Studies at Brookings, supra note 80, at 12.

2010]

WHAT GOOD IS HABEAS?

427

differ with or without habeas. To be sure, the thesis of habeas as
complete substitute rather than as complement cannot be ruled
out. But it seems unlikely to explain all the releases. First, in
habeas litigation, the government routinely expends
considerable time, personnel, and even credibility with the
federal bench arguing that individuals should be detained. There
is no reason to take this effort by the federal government at
anything other than face value. Second, and more powerfully,
the evidence suggests that when the federal government decides
to release a detainee who has a pending habeas action, it does so
without continuing to contest the habeas action by appeals.138
Given that the government abandons defense of habeas actions
when it determines a detainee should be released, there is no
reason to believe that its representations in otherwise contested
actions are anything other than sincere. It may be that a district
court loss truly conveys new information to the government. In
short, attributing 3.75 % of releases to habeas may be an
overestimation, but it is also unlikely that the proper estimate is
zero. Habeas, in short, has some effect in the cases in which a
court reaches a final judgment.
With respect to those habeas actions that do prevail, it is
plausible to posit that habeas counsel with stronger cases have
tended to push more aggressively in court, rather than hoping to
negotiate a favorable outcome with the government. The first
wave of habeas litigation in the district court thus likely selected
for strong cases in favor of release. In these cases, the district
court can dissolve a log-jam at the individual detainee level, just
as the Hamdi and Rasul judgments nudged the Executive into
more wholesale reconsideration of detainee processing. Judicial
action in these cases is evidence of a direct libertarian effect
from habeas. But that direct effect is numerically far less
important than the indirect effects of habeas jurisdiction being
confirmed in Rasul and Hamdi. That is, the bulk of releases
(from 2004-08) have taken place against the "shadow" of habeas
jurisdiction.
In this light, there is a strong analogy between habeas
litigation and theories of criminal procedure that emphasize the
indirect influence of constitutional rights upon plea-bargained
outcomes. As in the criminal adjudication context, the actual
138. See, e.g., Order Staying Proceedings, Batarfi v. Gates, No. 05-0409 (EGS), dkt.
178 (D.D.C. March 30, 2009) (on file with author) (staying proceedings to allow taskforce
to accomplish petitioner's transfer).
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exercise of constitutional rights in habeas may be less important
than the "shadow" cast by the government's expectation of those
rights.139 Detention policy thus largely unspools in the shadow of
the Suspension Clause, not under its direct gaze. In the criminal
context, a small number of cases do not settle through pleas
because of the inability of lawyers on each side to converge in
their assessment of the expected trial outcome. Similarly, the
residual core of litigated habeas may be explained by the
persistence of uncertainty as to trial outcomes. Habeas cases that
proceed to judgment represent instances of high variance in
litigants' expectations about outcomes. While the government
believes it has a strong case, detainee counsel believe that it is
only bureaucratic inefficiencies or sheer error that blocks
release. District court litigation, on this account, is a product of
epistemic uncertainty about the bases for detention as between
habeas counsel and their government counterparts.
However the litigation is explained, its effect at the margin
is small - at most 3.75 % and perhaps little as zero. So if Justice
Kennedy is right to point to a connection between habeas and
the freedom from unlawful constraints on physical liberty, the
connection is at best complex and indirect. Further, the data
reviewed in this essay are simply too ambiguous to confirm such
a relationship, even if they are sufficient to reject the thesis that
the relationship is a large one. The available public record is far
too hazy to permit any precise estimate of habeas's effect on
executive detention policy, beyond the conclusion that any direct
effect is likely small. Moreover, the forms of habeas review
remain very much a work in progress, subject to congressional or
high court reworking.
Despite this uncertainty, I will recklessly hazard here some
predictions. First, easy cases for release will run out as low
hanging fruit are consumed.140 Increasingly, detainees will lose in
the district courts, particularly since the D.C. Circuit's j udgment
in Kiyemba v. Obama141 signals the circuit court's limited
tolerance for creative remedial options. The Supreme Court's
decision to send that case back to the lower courts based on
139. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 309-17 (1983). But see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow
of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004) (challenging the "shadow-of-trial" model) .
140. See, e.g., Order Staying Proceedings, B atarfi v. Gates, supra note 138, ( staying
proceedings to allow taskforce to accomplish petitioner's transfer) .
141. 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009), vacated and
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1235, (2010) aff'd on remand 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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government assertions of changed facts, rather than addressing it
on the merits, further signals that the high court is unwilling to
interfere too much with political branch choices. Those
detainees who prevail, but do not secure release because of
forward-looking risk assessments by the interagency taskforce,142
will also obtain less and less sympathy on the remedial front.
District courts judges have already expressed unease at pushing
too hard upon the Executive. In a December 2009 hearing, for
example, Chief Judge Hogan bemoaned the "unfortunate" fact
that "the Legislative Branch of our government, and the
Executive Branch have not moved more strongly to E rovide
uniform clear rules and laws for handling these cases."1 3 More
tellingly, even the release orders currently issued in the habeas
actions do not call directly for physical release. In ambiguous
terms, most require the government to engage in "all necessary
and appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate" release.144 Only
two, Judge Huvelle's order concerning the juvenile detainee
Muhammed Jawad and Judge Kessler's concerning Alla Ali bin
Ali Ahmed, directly order release.145 Jawad's case, though, was
exceptional, and had already been a subject of controversy. 1 46
This pattern suggests that while courts might press the
government on procedural and evidentiary issues, there remains

142. The taskforce completed its assessment in January 2010, and recommended that
about fifty detainees be detained under law-of-war authority. See Peter Finn, Panel on
Guantanamo Backs Indefinite Detention for Some, WASH. POST, Jan., 22, 2010, at Al.
Notably, it seems as if that the presence of a judicial release order is merely one factor
(of many) the taskforce considered in determining whether release was appropriate.
143. Transcript of Hearing before Hon. Thomas F. Hogan, Abdu Anam v. Obama,
No. CA 01-1 194, at 6-7 (D.C.C. Dec. 14, 2009) (copy on file with author).
144. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 5 1 , 66 (D.D.C. 2009) (Kessler, J.);
see also Al-Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2009) (Leon, J.) (same);
Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2009) (Huvelle, J.) (same); Al
Rabiah v. Obama, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 , 42 (D.D.C. 2009) (Collar-Kotelly, J.).
145. See Order, Bacha v. Obama, No, 05-2385 (EJH) at 1 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009),
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/jawad_court_
order.pdf (ordering that "beginning on August 21, 2009, when 15 days following the
submission of the aforesaid information to the Congress have passed, respondents shall
promptly release petitioner Jawad from detention at the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantanamo B ay and transfer him to the custody of the receiving government"); Ahmed
v. Obama, No. 05-1 678 (GK), dkt. 249 (D.C.C. Oct., 1 2009) (on file with author). Thanks
to Shane Kadidal for providing a copy of this document. I am dubious that the D.C.
Circuit's since vacated opinion in Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), can
explain the district courts' behavior. While several district courts have invoked Kiyemba
in softening the terms of a release order, in fact Judge Leon began issuing non-release
final orders before Kiyemba was handed down. Still, Kiyemba's disavowal of effective
relief likely had an in terrorem effect, and likely will continue to do.
146. See William Glaberson, Guantanamo Prosecutor Is Quitting in Dispute Over a
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, at A20.
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at bottom a concern about noncompliance. That is, courts
continue to tread cautiously in the post-Boumediene habeas
cases, unsure of the boundaries of their own ability to press the
Administration to alter course. When push comes to shove,
molar security concerns will dominate granular liberty interests,
even for detainees found to be unconnected to any terrorist
group.
At the same time that indirect and direct effects of habeas
jurisdiction fade, the federal courts have done just enough to
deflate significant social mobilization in favor of further releases.
Boumediene celebrates legality but without furnishing any
constraining law. At the time of this writing, the received
wisdom in policy circles147 calls for fresh legislative involvement
in detention issues. Such calls are made under circumstances
wherein the only kind of legislative action that could pass both
Houses would expand detention authority and further restrict
the fragmented and incomplete influence of habeas review. The
calls for legislation not only trade on a critique of judicial
activism with partisan roots, but, more importantly, fail to
account accurately for either the subordinate position of courts
or the primacy of political actors' efforts to anticipate,
circumvent, and otherwise marginalize judicial action. The
Court, that is, has largely succeeded in diffusing effective
libertarian political mobilization around detention as a national
policy issue without achieving large policy change on the ground.
This analysis further has implications for future research.
Important recent scholarship on habeas has focused on
procedural questions of proof and evidentiary standards as a
locus of "significant rs olicy questions about competing risks and
their distributions."1 8 More ambitiously, other scholars have
asserted that the courts use procedure "as a corrective to
decision-making by one (or both) of the political branches."149
147. See BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, THE
EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING
1 (2010), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_
wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney. pdf.
148. Matthew C. Waxman, Facing the Challenges of Continued Detention and
Repatriation: Guantanamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof" Viewing the Law
Through Multiple Lens, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 245, 246 (2009); see generally Jenny
Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror, '' 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013
(2008).
149. Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive
Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661 , 665 (2009). Oddly, Landau largely relies on
opinions by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the scope of review under the
now defunct Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(e)(2), 10 U.S.C.§ 801. Cf Bismullah v.
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Although this procedural tum rnay produce valuable insights, it
should be complemented with an effort to understand the
incentives and felt limitations confronting federal judges in the
habeas cases. How conscious, for example, are judges of political
constraints on their ultimate remedial authority? To the extent
that the judiciary's relationship with the Bush Administration
came to be characterized by mistrust, has the shift to the Obama
Administration sapped judges' incentives to regulate detention
decisions closely? However tricky such questions are to answer
for evidentiary reasons, it may well be that the perceived balance
of authority and legitimacy between the judicial and executive
branches shapes the course of habeas litigation more than
doctrinal formulations that until now have attracted legal
scholars' attention.
CONCLUSION
Boumediene has been called "one of the most important
Supreme Court decisions in recent years. "150 But at best
Boumediene secured liberty from unlawful constraint only at the
margins - the most important work had been done long before
by Rasul and Hamdi - and failed in its pursuit of a more
ambitious separation-of-powers aim. The analysis here does not
condemn habeas as wholly ineffective. Rather, it suggests that
misty nostrums of separated powers provide little guidance or
insight into how federal courts and their coordinate political
branches interact to benefit or burden the exercise of human
liberty. The effects of habeas jurisdiction have been uncertain
and perhaps marginal. Before better data illuminates the
relationship between judicial actions and executive policy,
rhetoric either praising or condemning Boumediene is at a
minimum premature.

Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (invalidating §1005(e)(2) as nonseverable
from portions of the later-enacted Military Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7,
120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(e)).
150. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 18.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

Data for the Figures 1, 2, and 4 and Table 1 were derived in
the following way. The Department of Defense and Department
of Justice websites contain archives of daily press releases that
each relate to a release from Guantanamo and that each include
the number of detainees remaining on the base at a certain date,
and the total number released up to that point. These statistics
were recorded, double-checked, and cross-referenced against
press sources and other compilations of data. The data was also
cross-referenced and supplemented with press reports from the
end of the relevant time period. Annualized release data was
calculated by subtracting reported statistics from the last press
release of one year from the reported statistic on the last press
release of the next year.
The data in Figure 4 derive from an additional source. On
the one hand, the data of "non-habeas releases" comes fr om the
aforementioned press releases. Data about "habeas releases"
was derived fr om Propublica, the New York Times, and the
Brookings Institute, and then cross-referenced against the press
releases. This was possible because the government issued press
releases after a person was released subsequent to a district
court habeas decision as well as in the absence of such a
decision. In general, it was possible to corroborate release
claims. Data for Figure 3 was drawn from two articles in the New
York Times. The government keeps no running tally of Bagram
detentions in public portions of its websites.

